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SUBJECT: UN POLICE ASSESSMENT MISSION TO CHAD REPORTS  
GENERALLY POSITIVE RESULTS

¶1. Charge d'affaires and Refugee Coordinator received an outbriefing from members of the DPKO Mid-Term UN Police Assessment Mission to Chad June 13, including a generally positive assessment of performance by the DIS (Detachement Integree de Security, the special police force established to provide security for humanitarian operations in and around refugee camps and IDP sites) to date. New York-based DPKO Assessment Team leaders Ingrid Hayden and Walter Wolf told Charge that the original concept of how the DIS would be deployed to the field required some adjustment, given difficult security conditions in eastern Chad and the delay in full MINURCAT troop deployment. Wolf said that his assessment team had observed a clear need for further training for DIS officers with a particular emphasis on basic police procedures and proper weapons handling. He said recent disciplinary problems in various field locations involved less than five percent of the force, which was considered an acceptable average in police organizations worldwide. Wolf added that his team had observed a good working relationship between the DIS and UN Police colleagues providing mentoring and continued training in the field. Wolf acknowledged that closer supervision of DIS officers by UNPOL trainers could improve future performance.

¶2. The DPKO team offered that misunderstanding of the DIS mandate by humanitarian actors had led to inflated expectations and an overly critical review of DIS performance in the field. According to the assessment team, humanitarians sometimes mistakenly expected DIS officers to perform the same escort services for daily convoys to refugee camps and IDP sites that the prior protection force (CNAR) had performed before the creation of the DIS. Prior to the DIS, CNAR, the Chadian National Commission for the Welcome and Reintegration of Refugees, was responsible for both legal activities such as refugee status determination and security services such as protection in and around the camps. (Note: Because UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations worked closely with CNAR on legal and assistance issues related to the refugee population, they were able to develop a relationship with the Commission which eased coordination of CNAR escort activities in the field. In most cases, MINURCAT military troops are now tasked with escorting humanitarian convoys for distances longer than 10 kms. Coordinating escort logistics thus has recently involved a greater number of military and civilian actors than in the past, resulting in less time for aid organizations to spend in the camps on a daily basis. This has contributed to impatience with the DIS on the part of some humanitarian organizations. End note.)

¶3. In response to a request from Charge for regular lists of DIS accomplishments, the team reported consistent DIS success with arrests of perpetrators targeting humanitarians for carjackings and office invasions. DIS officers have increased security for women in many camps through increased patrols and deployment of female officers to assist women

refugee victims of crime. Charge emphasized that UNPOL and MINURCAT needed to do a better job of educating humanitarian and donors as to the limits of the DIS mandate. Charge called for more concerted UN efforts to publicize DIS success stories and explain chain of command relations between the DIS and MINURCAT/UNPOL mentors, so as to demonstrate the degree to which the UN exerted influence over the DIS. She specifically asked that UNPOL distribute to donors a periodic accounting of DIS officers' actions in various field locations.

14. In turn, the team requested diplomatic assistance in encouraging the GoC to provide DIS officers with promised equipment and weapons. The team said it would share a written report on its mission once the document was released in New York.

BREMNER